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Abstract 
We conduct a discrete choice experiment to investigate how the mission of high-tech companies 
affects job attractiveness and induces self-selection of science and engineering graduates with 
respect to their prosocial attitudes. We characterize mission by whether or not the company 
combines its profit motive with a mission on innovation or corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Furthermore, we vary job design (e.g. autonomy) and contractible job attributes (e.g. job security). 
We find that companies with a mission on innovation or CSR are considered more attractive. 
Women and individuals who are more altruistic and less competitive feel particularly attracted to 
such companies.  
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1. Introduction 
Each organization has a mission: a motive for its existence. Organizations in the private sector 
naturally have a profit motive, but they often have broader objectives that play a key role in their 
long-term strategy such as being innovative or being socially responsible.1 For example, Tesla 
prominently advertises its mission “to accelerate the world’s transition to sustainable energy”, 
and Philips advertises its mission “to make a healthier, more sustainable world”. An 
organization’s mission has strong implications for those who are employed in the organization as 
it affects what they work on, how their work impacts on society, and the criteria by which their 
performance is judged. Employees and employers therefore have a shared interest in creating a 
match between employees’ preferences and values and the organization’s mission.2 
Despite the importance of organizations’ mission, little is known about how an organization’s 
mission affects the perceived attractiveness of a job, and how it affects the composition of the 
pool of applicants with regard to their personality traits and attitudes.3 For instance, organizations 
with a mission regarding social responsibility may particularly attract applicants with prosocial 
attitudes, whereas competitive individuals may feel more at ease in companies that merely focus 
on making profit. This question is particularly important for organizations that want to hire 
graduates in science and engineering, since those graduates can choose among a wide range of 
organizations that value their skills. 
This paper investigates the role of company’s mission for recruiting prospective employees 
in the high-tech sector. We conduct a hypothetical discrete choice experiment among master 
students in science and engineering from the two largest technical universities of the Netherlands 
(N=1498). We investigate whether companies with a focus on innovation or corporate social 
                                                             
 
1 Having objectives besides profit does not imply sacrificing profits, as the objectives can be related to a 
strategy to ensure long-term profitability. For example, corporate social responsibility may generate 
goodwill that has immediate returns. Barnett and Salomon (2006) analyze financial performance of 61 
socially responsible investment funds and find a u-shaped relation between the number of social screens 
used and financial performance. Gartenberg et al. (2019) show that companies that are perceived high in 
purpose by their employees have systematically higher stock market performance, provided management 
clearly communicates the firm’s purpose. Flammer (2015) exploits a regression-discontinuity design to 
show that corporate social responsibility leads to superior financial performance. Possible channels are 
higher labor productivity and sales growth.   
2 An often-voiced concern is that workers who do not subscribe to the organization’s mission are less 
satisfied with their job, less motivated, and more likely to leave the organization. According to a recent 
report by Deloitte on millennials: “In organizational cultures without perceived purpose, only one out of 
five millennials are satisfied at work” (Smith and Turner, 2017). 
3 Previous literature in economics on job attractiveness has concentrated on the valuation of contractible 
job attributes and flexible working time arrangements, see e.g. Eriksson and Kristensen (2014), Mas and 
Pallais (2017), and Wiswall and Zafar (2018). 
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responsibility (CSR) and sustainability are considered more attractive employers, and whether the 
mission of the company affects the composition of the workforce with respect to prosocial 
attitudes, competitiveness and university grade point average. We design a discrete choice 
experiment in which respondents choose five times among three hypothetical jobs that differ in 
job design (i.e. autonomy at work, teamwork, and workload), contractible attributes (i.e. wage, 
performance pay, and job security), and, importantly, mission of the company. We sketch jobs in 
companies that focus exclusively on maximizing profit, or that in addition to profit focus on 
innovation or on corporate social responsibility and sustainability. Moreover, we include a non-
profit organization to investigate how applicants value working in a commercial company versus 
working in a company without profit motive. Respondents trade off these job attributes by ranking 
the three jobs of each choice set. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, mission matters. Keeping all other job 
aspects constant, potential job applicants prefer to work in commercial organizations that aim to 
be innovative, as well as in organizations that show corporate social responsibility. At the same 
time, they do not express a clear preference for working in non-profit organizations over 
organizations that view making profit as their sole purpose. Commercial organizations with social 
objectives therefore have a competitive advantage in the labor market. Workers are on average 
willing to forgo 150 euros in terms of net monthly salary to work in a company that focuses on 
innovation, and 200 euros to work in a company that focuses on CSR and sustainability. Second, 
a company’s mission affects the composition of the pool of applicants. Non-profit organizations 
and commercial organizations with social objectives attract more women and applicants who tend 
to be less competitive and more prosocial than organizations that focus exclusively on profit. We 
find no evidence that this comes at the cost of attracting less talented individuals, as measured by 
respondents’ grade point average. 
The attractiveness of a job also depends on other attributes than the focus of the company. 
Potential job applicants also highly value autonomy and work in multidisciplinary teams. This is 
consistent with the idea that workers care about perceived job meaning: according to Cassar and 
Meier (2018), perceptions of job meaning depend on the organization’s mission, autonomy in 
decision making, and feelings of competence and relatedness. As predicted by standard economic 
theory, we find that job applicants also care about wages, job security, and workload. Performance 
pay is valued neither negatively nor positively. We also find some interesting patterns of self-
selection. Organizations that offer high job autonomy can expect to attract relatively competitive 
individuals and more women. A generous salary attracts competitive and selfish individuals. 
Finally, as we might expect, teamwork is particularly valued by individuals who have high trust 
in others, and job security is particularly valued by risk averse individuals.  
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The first contribution of this paper is that we empirically establish the importance of 
organizations’ mission in the labor market. Previous studies on workers’ job preferences have 
concentrated on contractible job attributes such as fringe benefits and flexible working time 
arrangements, but have ignored the importance of company mission and job design, see Eriksson 
and Kristensen (2014), Mas and Pallais (2017), and Wiswall and Zafar (2018). Moreover, 
previous studies have examined preference heterogeneity by demographic characteristics, but not 
by economic preferences and personality traits. A few studies complement ours by reporting 
workers’ revealed preference for corporate social responsibility. Burbano (2016) informs 
randomly chosen workers on two online marketplaces about the social activities of the firm, and 
find that this information reduced their wage demands by 12 to 44 percent. Bode et al. (2015) 
analyze data from a large consultancy firm, and find that employees who participate in 
consultancy projects for charitable organizations are more likely to stay with the firm. Carnahan 
et al. (2015) examine how law firms’ CSR initiatives influence occupation changes of attorneys 
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The idea is that shocking events such as terrorist attacks increase 
the desire to act prosocially, stimulating individuals to reconsider their career choices. They find 
that attorneys born in New York City are more likely to quit the profession after the attacks than 
officemates born outside New York City, who are less likely to be psychologically affected by 
the attacks. Importantly, this effect is attenuated by pro-bono legal services of the law firms, 
suggesting that prosocial activities help to reduce turnover of employees who care about their 
impact on society. Consistent with this interpretation, firms with higher levels of CSR also have 
lower turnover to different occupations or startup law firms (Carnahan et al., 2017). A difference 
with our study is that our discrete choice experiment allows us to assess the value of mission 
relative to several other job attributes.4 
The second contribution is that we investigate the importance of private sector organizations’ 
mission for attracting prosocial individuals. Previous literature in economics has highlighted the 
role of individuals’ prosociality as a determinant of choice between the public and private sector, 
see e.g. Banuri and Keefer (2016), Buurman et al. (2012), Dur and Zoutenbier (2014, 2015), 
Gregg et al. (2011), Hanna and Wang (2017), Jacobsen et al. (2011), and Kolstad and Lindkvist 
(2013). We extend this research by pointing at the role of mission in the private sector. A number 
of closely related studies have investigated how job advertisements influence the pool of 
applicants in public sector jobs. Ashraf et al. (2016) conduct a field experiment in the recruitment 
                                                             
 
4 A number of studies on job preferences of health care workers in Africa include job attributes such as 
sector (public/private) and opportunities to help other people (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2016, Doiron et al., 
2014, and Kolstad, 2011). However, these studies are conducted in a markedly different context than 
ours, and are silent on the selection effects of the mission of the organization. 
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of health workers in Zambia. They experimentally vary whether the job advertisement emphasizes 
career prospects or contribution to society, and find that emphasizing career prospects attracts 
individuals who provide more services and produce better health outcomes. Likewise, Dal-Bó et 
al. (2013) find that a higher advertised salary for public sector workers in Mexico attracts workers 
who are more productive.5   
We also contribute to the literature in management and personnel psychology on applicant 
attraction. An important concept in this literature is Person-Organization fit (P-O fit), which is 
often operationalized as the match between individuals’ values and their perception of the 
organization’s values (Evertz and Süss, 2017; Kristof, 1996). According to meta-analyzes by 
Chapman et al. (2005) and Uggerslev et al. (2012), perceptions of P-O fit are key drivers of 
applicant attraction. Only few studies, however, have investigated fit between individuals’ 
prosocial values and organizations’ mission.6  
A final contribution is that we focus on students in science and engineering who are about to 
enter the labor market. These students potentially have a high impact on technological innovation 
and economic growth in their later careers (Murphy et al., 1991). However, their societal impact 
will also depend on the mission of the organizations they end up working for. This makes studying 
their job preferences particularly relevant. Moreover, given the social relevance of high-tech 
products, companies in high-tech sectors have ample opportunities to communicate their 
relevance for society to potential job applicants. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the discrete choice experiment and its 
theoretical background, the measurement of personality characteristics, social and economic 
preferences as well as the main characteristics of the sample. In sections 3 and 4, we discuss the 
estimation method and results, respectively. Section 5 concludes. 
                                                             
 
5 There is also a substantial literature on the effect of mission on worker motivation and the complex 
interplay with financial incentives, e.g. for example Ariely et al. (2009), Ashraf et al. (2014), Imas (2014), 
Carpenter and Gong (2016), Fehrler and Kosfeld (2014), Gerhards (2015), Tonin and Vlassopoulos 
(2010, 2015), and Cassar (2019). Laboratory experiments by Fehrler and Kosfeld (2014) and Tonin and 
Vlassopoulos (2015) also include treatments that allow individuals to self-select into mission-oriented 
organizations, represented by working for the benefit of a charity of their own choice. However, they do 
not relate these preferences to individuals’ prosocial attitudes. Another difference is that, other than in 
many real-life situations, the social dimension is not intrinsically bundled with the production of the 
good: effort is not helping others except for the charity contribution. 
6 Gully et al. (2013 experimentally vary job advertisements by extending the desired applicant profile 
with social and environmental consciousness. They find that the modified job advertisement makes the 
organization more attractive for job seekers who desire to make a significant societal impact through 
work. Evans and Davis (2011) and Zhang and Gowan (2012 study the role of CSR in applicant attraction, 
and its relation to other-regarding values and ethical predispositions, respectively. They specifically 
define CSR as legal compliance, fair treatment of stakeholders, and transparency, which is more narrow 
than what we have in mind. 
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2. Methods 
2.1. Experimental design 
A. 2.1.1. Discrete choice experiment 
Discrete choice experiments have two important advantages over naturally occurring revealed 
preference data. First, discrete choice experiments allow the researcher to vary job attributes 
exogenously, which is rarely observed in naturally occurring data. Second, in experimental data 
all available choice options are observed, including the options that are not chosen. Studies on 
actual behavior are typically not able to identify all options available.  
An obvious concern of discrete choice experiments is their external validity. Hainmüller et 
al. (2015) provide a validation of this methodology by comparing preferences for migrant 
characteristics derived from discrete choice experiments with actual voting behavior in referenda 
on naturalization. They show that experimentally elicited stated preferences are close to revealed 
preferences when the experimental design forces participants to make trade-offs, as is the case in 
our design. More generally, they conclude that respondent engagement with the choices to be 
made is a key factor for the reliability of the results.   
We design our discrete choice experiment specifically for MSc students. Focusing on this 
group has a number of advantages. First, MSc students are about to enter the labor market. They 
therefore have strong incentives to think carefully about their job preferences, resulting in high 
engagement with the survey topic. Second, students are a homogeneous group in terms of age and 
stage of their career, which facilitates the interpretation of the results.   
The core of our discrete choice experiment consists of the rankings respondents make among 
three hypothetical jobs in five different choice sets. Figure 1 shows a screenshot to illustrate how 
we present the task to participants. The screen shows a choice set with three jobs, which 
respondents are asked to rank according to their preferences. Each of the five choice sets is 
presented on a separate screen. This design balances respondent load and the amount of 
information we collect. We opt for a rank-order design instead of ratings, since we want to force 
individuals to make choices.7    
                                                             
 
7 An alternative would be to impose that respondents discriminate jobs in their ratings, but this increases 
complexity without providing much additional information.  
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Jobs in each choice set differ in eight job attributes that are exogenously varied. As all jobs 
are randomly generated, each respondent evaluates different choice sets. The values of each job 
attribute are randomly drawn from the set of possible values. The randomization is subject to two 
constraints. First, we rule out that a job attribute takes on three times the same value in a choice 
set. This ensures that there is variation in each attribute within each choice set, which increases 
the information implicit in respondents’ choices.8 Second, we rule out two implausible 
combinations of job attributes. If work is conducted on one’s own, pay-for-performance is never 
based on team performance, but always on individual performance. Vice versa, if work is 
conducted in teams, performance pay is not based on individual performance. Although these 
combinations are theoretically possible (profit-sharing, pay based on peer assessment), their 
inclusion might well confuse respondents.  
One might be concerned that respondents find it daunting to compare jobs that differ in eight 
dimensions. This complexity may increase noise in the answers, but it also adds realism as in 
practice jobs also differ along several important dimensions. 
B. 2.1.2. Choice of attributes and attribute values 
Jobs differ in the following attributes, which can be grouped into three categories:  
1. Mission of the company: focus of the company. 
2. Job design: autonomy, teamwork and workload. 
3. Contractible characteristics: salary, performance pay, and job security. 
Furthermore, we include occupation (Research and Development, Management, Sales) in the 
experiment and in our analyses, but we do not report the results for ease of presentation.9 
We based our selection of job attributes on practical relevance. As a starting point, we 
screened job advertisements on one of the largest job fairs for MSc students in engineering in the 
Netherlands, which takes place annually at the Eindhoven University of Technology. We used 
this information to discuss the importance of several job attributes with recruiters in the high-tech 
sector as well as employer representatives of the sector. 
                                                             
 
8 Note that this procedure does not preclude the possibility that subjects incidentally see the same job 
twice in a choice set, but this happened in only two out of 7,490 choice sets. More generally, 36 subjects 
evaluate the same job in different choice sets.  
9 Results on occupation are relevant for employers in high-tech sectors, but they are also context-specific 
and therefore less interesting from a scientific perspective. Results are available upon request.  
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Table 1 provides an overview of job attributes and the corresponding values. We designed 
attribute values in such a way that they are realistic and sufficiently specific to allow for 
meaningful comparisons. We are particularly interested in the focus of the company. We 
distinguish between two dimensions: profit motive and contribution to society. On the one 
extreme, we pitch an organization that is strongly driven by profit. The other extreme is a non-
profit organization, which encompasses a wide variety of organizations (e.g. government, charity, 
university, research institute). Commercial organizations with a pro-social mission fall in 
between: they combine a profit motive with a mission on innovation and/or CSR and 
sustainability. 
Furthermore, we quantified job attributes as much as possible. We used our discussions 
with recruiters and employers in the high-tech sector to determine what variation in attribute 
values would be realistic. For example, starting salaries of MSc graduates in the sector typically 
hoover between 1800 and 2200 euro net per month. Likewise, performance pay components, 
when present, are usually responsible for roughly 10% higher or lower wages in this sector. We 
also took care to make abstract attributes such as autonomy and teamwork as specific as possible. 
In case we had to trade off realism and specificity of attribute values we gave priority to the latter. 
This resulted in stylized descriptions of attribute values that are more extreme than what we most 
often observe in practice (e.g. high-skilled work always entails some team component). However, 
we think that making abstract attributes more explicit helps respondents to understand their 
importance and to express their preferences. 
  
2.2. Measurement of personality characteristics 
We collect information on a variety of background characteristics such as age, gender, nationality 
(defined as country of birth) and study specialization (i.e. master program). Moreover, in our 
survey we included the following measures of personality characteristics and economic 
preferences: 
Altruism: We use two questions proposed by Falk et al. (2016) to measure altruism:  
1. “How would you assess your willingness to share with others without expecting anything 
in return, for example your willingness to give to charity?” (Extent of agreement 
expressed on a continuous scale from 0 to 10.) 
2. “Imagine the following situation: Today you unexpectedly received 1000 Euro. How 
much of this amount would you donate to charity? (Any value between 0 and 1000 is 
allowed)”  
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Falk et al. (2016) identify these questions as the best available survey measures of altruism, since 
they are the best predictors of altruistic behavior in an incentivized experiment (transfers in a 
dictator game with a charitable organization as recipient). We take the first principal component 
of these two questions to construct our measure of altruism. 
Competitiveness: We measure competitiveness with a selection of items from the Revised 
Competitiveness Index (Houston et al. 2002). We use the following three items:  
1. I try to avoid competing with others (reversed) 
2. I don’t like competing against other people (reversed) 
3. I like competition 
The full scale consists of fourteen items, but we select three items to reduce survey length. We 
base the selection of these items on an analysis of the full scale, exploiting data collected among 
university students where we elicited the full scale as part of an unrelated laboratory experiment 
(N=240)10. We select the three items that jointly show the highest correlation with the full scale 
(0.94 for the items mentioned above). Respondents express their extent of agreement with each 
of those statements on a five-point scale. 
Trust: We measure trust by asking subjects to what extent they agree with the following 
statements (five-point scale): 
1. On the whole, one can trust people 
2. Nowadays, one can’t rely on anyone (reversed) 
3. If dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them (reversed) 
Those items are taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and are validated by 
Fehr et al. (2002).  
Grade: We measure academic achievement with the grade obtained in the master program 
so far. Grades in the Netherlands are always expressed on a scale 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), where 
5.5 is the minimum passing grade. Only 2.4% of the sample reports an average grade below 5.5, 
and roughly 50% of all grades are between 7 and 8 (bounds included). 
Self-Efficacy: We measure self-efficacy with a selection of items from the New General Self-
Efficacy Scale (Chen et al., 2001). We use the following three items:  
                                                             
 
10 Results are available upon request. The sample of this lab experiment mainly consist of business and 
economics student. 
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1. I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself. 
2. I will be able to successfully overcome many challenges. 
3. Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very well. 
While the original scale consists of 14 items, we selected three items based on the same procedure 
we used to select items from the competitiveness index. We exploit questionnaire data from an 
unrelated laboratory experiment among university students (N=240) to select the three items that 
jointly show the highest correlation with the full scale. The three items we selected have a 0.95 
correlation with the original 14-item scale. 
Risk tolerance:  We measure individuals’ attitude towards risk by a widely used 
subjective risk question (see Falk et al., 2016 and Dohmen et al., 2011, for validation of this 
measure). Respondents indicate on a continuous scale from 0-10 to what extent the following 
statement applies to them: “How do you see yourself: are you a person who is generally willing 
to take risks, or do you try to avoid taking risks?” 
 
2.3. Data  
Our sample consists of MSc students in science and engineering from the two largest 
technical universities of the Netherlands: Delft and Eindhoven. In the Netherlands, MSc programs 
in science and engineering take two years. We approached both first and second-year MSc 
students. The surveys were conducted in March 2015 (Eindhoven) and July 2016 (Delft). We 
collected 595 and 903 valid responses (15% and 10% of the approached population in Eindhoven 
and Delft, respectively). Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the main variables. Overall, 
student populations of the two universities are comparable in terms of observable characteristics. 
At both universities, non-Dutch students predominantly come from China and India (13% in Delft 
and 14% in Eindhoven) and other European countries (10% in Delft and 9% in Eindhoven).  
We also collected descriptive statistics on the population of registered MSc students of 
both universities. Compared to the overall population, it seems that women are overrepresented 
in our sample (Delft: 36% in the sample vs 27% in the population; Eindhoven: 27% in the sample 
vs 20% in the population). Students with Dutch nationality are somewhat underrepresented (Delft: 
61% in the sample vs 68% in the population; Eindhoven: 64% in the sample vs 82% in the 
population).11   
                                                             
 
11 Information on population statistics is derived from the institutions’ registration of students enrolled in 
their MSc programs. The population of students enrolled in master programs is not necessarily the same 
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Table 3 reports correlations between the various personal characteristics, personality 
traits and preferences. Most correlations have the expected sign. For example, competitive 
individuals score higher on self-efficacy, are less altruistic, and more willing to take risks. Women 
tend to be less competitive than men. As expected, self-efficacy and grades are positively 
correlated (r=0.15). Dutch students appear more trusting and less altruistic than students from 
other countries. Note that this may not only reflect cultural differences, but also selection effects, 
as well as differences in the interpretation of questions.  
 
 
3. Econometric Framework 
To exploit all available information in the choices respondents make, we estimate mixed rank-
ordered logit models. This model is developed to analyze choices individuals make in a number 
of different choice situations.12 The analysis of such data requires methods that deal with the 
discrete and ordinal nature of choice data, as well as the correlation that arises naturally across 
choice situations. When an individual has a particularly strong preference for one attribute, this 
preference influences his or her choices in all choice situations. Individuals’ choices can therefore 
not be treated as independent observations. Mixed rank-ordered logit models address this in a 
natural way by allowing the preference parameters to differ over individuals.13 
The model is based on the assumption that individuals choose the alternative that 
maximizes their utility. The utility function consists of a systematic and stochastic part. 
Specifically, utility of alternative j in choice situation t for individual i is described by: 
𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑥𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   , 
 
where 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛾 are coefficient vectors, 𝑥𝑗𝑡  is a vector with job attributes, 𝑧𝑖  is a vector with 
individual characteristics, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is an error term. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is independent and 
identically (iid) extreme-value distributed. The defining characteristic of the mixed rank-ordered 
logit model is that the coefficient vector 𝛽𝑖 differs over individuals. The coefficients are assumed 
                                                             
 
as the population we approached. For instance, our sample includes exchange students, which may 
explain why we have relatively more non-Dutch students. In the absence of more detailed information, it 
is not possible to make precise comparisons.  
12 Useful introductions to mixed logit models are Revelt and Train (1998), Layton (2000), Lancsar et al. 
(2017) and Hensher and Greene (2003). 
13 The less complicated rank-ordered logit models can deal with the discrete and ordinal nature of rank-
ordered choice data, but ignore the correlation between choice observations. 
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to be normally distributed with mean 𝛽 and variance 𝜃. This is the main difference with the 
standard rank-ordered logit model, which assumes that 𝛽𝑖 is the same for all individuals, i.e. 𝛽𝑖= 𝛽. 
Since individuals’ preferences for job attributes are likely to be correlated, we allow the 
individual-specific parameters to be correlated.14 We are also interested in the parameter vector 𝛾, 
which captures the interaction between job characteristics and individual characteristics such as 
gender, grade, and social preferences. The interaction terms allow the valuation of job 
characteristics to differ systematically between individuals, and are therefore not individual-
specific. 
Individuals choose the alternative j from choice set t that gives them highest utility. The 
probability that individual i prefers alternative j over all alternatives k in choice set t is therefore 
described by: 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑃𝑟(𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑈𝑖𝑘𝑡 > 0), ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝑗 
 
As utility depends on the iid extreme-value distributed error term 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , the probability that 
individual i chooses alternative j is described by: 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝑒𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑗𝑡+𝛾
′𝑥𝑗𝑡∗𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑗𝑡+𝛾
′𝑥𝑗𝑡∗𝑧𝑖
𝑗
 
 
The sequence of choices made by individual i occurs with probability  
𝑆𝑖 = ∏
𝑒𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑗𝑡+𝛾
′𝑥𝑗𝑡∗𝑧𝑖
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑗𝑡+𝛾
′𝑥𝑗𝑡∗𝑧𝑖
𝑗
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
We estimate the parameters 𝛽𝑖  and 𝜃 that maximize this probability using simulated maximum 
likelihood.  
We do not allow all coefficients to differ between individuals. We assume that individuals 
equally value a higher wage, so that we can use the wage as a common metric to compute the 
implied monetary value of job attributes. Also, we control for order effects to obtain more precise 
                                                             
 
14 For instance, consider an individual who greatly cares about making a difference in the life of others. It 
is likely that this individual cares more than average about both focus of the company and job autonomy, 
so that he or she can also decide on the exact way to help others. See Hess and Train (2017) for further 
examples. Failure to take this correlation into account could lead to over- or underestimation of the 
marginal rates of substitution. 
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estimates: we include dummy variables that indicate whether a job is presented on the left of the 
screen, in the center, or on the right.15  
The rank ordered logit is also referred to as exploded logit, because it exploits information 
on the preference relations that are revealed by the ranking. Assuming that the ranking process is 
sequential, respondents first choose the most attractive alternative from the choice set, and then 
choose the most attractive option out of the remaining alternatives.16 The data is ‘exploded’ to 
represent this choice process, which means in our case that the dataset is transformed to record 
the preferred option among the three alternatives as well as between the two remaining 
alternatives. This implies that we have five observations per choice set. As each individual is 
confronted with five choice sets, the total number of observations in the estimations is equal to 
25 times the number of respondents. The mixed rank-ordered logit model is estimated as mixed 
logit on the ‘exploded’ data. All reported estimations are based on 200 Halton draws to 
approximate the log-likelihood function, see Lancsar et al. (2017) for a discussion of the trade-
offs involved. 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Average preferences for job attributes 
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a mixed rank-ordered logit model to 
establish the average value of each job attribute. In terms of the econometric model explained 
above, we estimate the parameters 𝛽𝑖 assuming 𝛾 = 0. Next, in Section 4.2, we interact job 
attributes with individual characteristics to examine how job preferences differ by individual 
characteristics.  
Table 4 presents the estimation results. The first column reports the mean estimated 
coefficients, the second column the estimated standard deviation of the individual coefficients. 
Note that the dependent variable (rank 1-3) is inverted, so that positive coefficients indicate higher 
                                                             
 
15 Dummies indicate whether a job was presented as job A, B, or C (see Figure 1). We do not allow these 
order effects to differ over individuals. Jobs presented in the middle column (job B) are chosen more 
frequently, while jobs presented on the right of the screen are least preferred. Those order effects are 
small in magnitude. Correcting for order effects increases the precision of the estimates.  
16 A limitation is that, under the assumption of transitivity, we ignore the information implicit in 
evaluations of the same job in different choice sets. However, this situation occurs only 36 times in our 
data.  
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levels of attractiveness.17 Coefficients can be interpreted as log odds, or after exponentiating, odds 
ratios.  
Concerning the mission of the company, we find that respondents have a clear preference 
for working in a commercial organization with a focus on innovation or CSR & sustainability. 
Respondents find working for a non-profit organization less desirable, although they still prefer 
non-profit organizations over organizations that focus exclusively on making profit. These 
differences are statistically significant at the one percent level. The odds that a job in a company 
with a focus on innovation is chosen are 50 percent higher than when the company would focus 
on profit. 
All other job attributes are also significantly related to job rank, with the noteworthy 
exception of pay-for-performance.18 Respondents positively value autonomy and teamwork, in 
particular work in multidisciplinary teams. Those findings are consistent with the idea that 
individuals care about job meaning in the sense of Cassar and Meier (2018), who define job 
meaning as a function of mission, autonomy, feelings of competence and relatedness. Moreover, 
respondents care about salary, workload, and a (reasonable perspective on a) permanent contract. 
Moving from a low salary to a high salary and from no autonomy to full autonomy has the largest 
impact on the odds that a job is preferred. It is important to take into account that the effect sizes 
are evaluated relative to the reference category: €400 additional monthly salary is a substantial 
difference. Likewise, university graduates are unlikely to be offered a job with no autonomy at 
all. The estimated variation in individual coefficients gives an indication of preference 
heterogeneity. Opinions seem generally divided, as the estimated variation is substantial for most 
attributes.19  
The value of job attributes can be expressed in monetary terms by comparing the 
estimated coefficients with the estimated effect of a €200 wage increase. The third column in 
Table 4 provides an overview of the implied monetary value of each job attribute, while Figure 2 
provides a graphical illustration.20 The estimated value of a mission on innovation or CSR is 
                                                             
 
17 This rank-order reversion is implicit in the ‘exploded’ data structure.  
18 Note that the performance-based wage component in our experiment is 10% of the wage, which 
corresponds with the experimental variation in salary levels. It is therefore hard to argue that the 
performance-based wage variation is too small. Perhaps individuals are generally confident that they will 
meet performance targets, or they do not mind wage fluctuations because they expect to be capable of 
income smoothing. 
19 In fact, the implied coefficients are negative for some individuals and positive for others. We should 
not overinterpret this finding, however, since negative coefficients might be an artefact of the assumed 
normal distribution of the parameters. 
20 We divide the estimated coefficient of each job attribute by the average value of a €200 wage increase. 
Specifically, we divide all coefficients by  1 2⁄ (𝛽€2000 +
1
2⁄ 𝛽€2200) , where 𝛽€2200 is the increase in 
attractiveness of a job that pays €2200 relative to a job that pays €1800.  
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roughly worth the equivalent of a €150-€200 monthly net salary raise, respectively. Work in 
multidisciplinary teams (rather than individual work) and full job autonomy and are even worth 
the equivalent of €300 and €400 monthly net salary raise, respectively. Individuals also demand 
more than €300 compensation for regularly working overtime.  
We should, however, be careful interpreting these numbers. First, it should be noted that 
there is substantial preference heterogeneity, implying that observed wage differentials will be 
much smaller due to self-selection. For example, organizations will not compensate workers with 
€300 higher salary for working overtime frequently as long as there are sufficient workers who 
do not mind working overtime so much and are therefore satisfied with a lower compensation. 
Second, in practice not all job characteristics are easily observable for potential applicants, and 
observable characteristics may signal the presence of unobservable characteristics. The valuation 
of a €200 higher salary is therefore not clear when it is also perceived to signal high workload or 
high job autonomy. Third, applicants may view organizations’ prosocial mission statements with 
skepticism when they are not backed up by their products and policies. Similar credibility issues 
may arise in communications regarding work load and job autonomy. With these caveats in mind, 
we can conclude that, ceteris paribus, workers are on average willing to accept a €200 lower wage 
when the organization has a prosocial mission. 
We also conducted a short follow-up survey among a subset of respondents three years after 
the initial survey (N=108). This gives us an impression whether the job characteristics included 
in our hypothetical choice experiment relate to job satisfaction. We describe the results in the 
appendix. Given the small number of observations we should be careful not to overinterpret the 
findings, but the overall pattern is consistent with the findings from the hypothetical choice 
experiment. Workers who report that their organization emphasizes innovation report higher job 
satisfaction. Likewise, we find that job autonomy, job security and monodisciplinary teamwork 
are positively valued. 
 
4.2. Heterogeneity in preferences by personality traits and economic preferences 
The next step in the analysis is to examine heterogeneity in job preferences by personality. 
We therefore extend the mixed rank-ordered logit model with interactions between the job 
attributes and personality characteristics. As before, all main effects except for wage are allowed 
to vary over individuals. We also include interaction terms to control for university (Eindhoven 
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or Delft) and nationality.21 Table 5 reports the estimation results. Columns 1 and 2 show the mean 
estimated coefficients and their standard deviations for the reference category, which is a male 
Dutch student from the Delft University of Technology.  
 
A. Mission of the company 
We find that women have a stronger preference for working in a non-profit or a for-profit 
with a prosocial mission than men. These effects are statistically significant at the one percent 
level after controlling for personality characteristics. Gender differences in mission preferences 
therefore do not seem to be driven by gender differences in competitiveness or altruism.22 The 
effect is sizeable. For instance, men are 1.74 times more likely to prefer a for-profit with a focus 
on innovation over a profit oriented company, whereas women are 2.34 times more likely to do 
so. Organizations with a prosocial mission are also more likely to attract individuals with 
prosocial attitudes: individuals who are less competitive and those who are more altruistic.23 One 
standard deviation increase in competitiveness reduces the odds that a for-profit with a focus on 
innovation is preferred over a profit oriented company from 1.74 to 1.54. The effect of 
competitiveness on preferences for mission on CSR is in the same order of magnitude. 
B. Job design 
Various attributes of job design also induce self-selection of job applicants. Teamwork is 
particularly valued by individuals who have high trust in others. This is consistent with the 
economic intuition that individuals who have high trust in others are less concerned about free-
rider behavior of team members.  
Selection effects of autonomy are less clear. We do not find a relation with self-efficacy, and 
only a weak relation with academic achievement. Specifically, we find a significant interaction 
between individuals’ grade point average and the intermediate level of autonomy, but not the 
highest level of autonomy. The desire for job autonomy therefore seems independent of perceived 
                                                             
 
21 For ease of presentation we do not report the coefficients of the other variables included in the model, 
i.e. order effects and job attributes interacted with university and nationality. 
22 We cannot rule out that gender differences in competitiveness or altruism drive gender differences in 
mission preferences. Both attitudes are hard to measure precisely, while gender is measured without error. 
However, gender differences in competitiveness and altruism are small in this sample (see correlations in 
Table 3). 
23 As mentioned, our measure of altruism consists of two questions: willingness to share with others and 
willingness to contribute to charity. Results are comparable when we use either of the two measures.  
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ability.24 Job autonomy seems to be particularly valued by women. This might be related to the 
finding that women care more about the ‘meaning’ of their job to society at large, so it is natural 
that they also want to contribute significantly to reaching that objective.  
High workload induces a selection effect that is hard to interpret. Risk tolerant individuals 
seem to have less problems with working overtime, and this effect is statistically significant at the 
1% level. A possible interpretation of this finding is that risk-tolerant individuals are willing to 
risk their health and social relations for their career. However, in the absence of empirical 
evidence on this specific mechanism we should be careful not to overinterpret this finding. 
C. Contractible aspects 
A straightforward way to increase the attractiveness of a job is to offer a competitive salary. 
Our results confirm this standard economic prediction. However, higher salaries may also change 
the composition of the pool of applicants. The results reported in Table 5 suggest that competitive 
and selfish individuals particularly value high salaries, which is consistent with previous findings 
of Reuben et al. (2015, 2017) and Kamas and Preston (2018). These effects are statistically 
significant at the one percent level. We also find that paying high salaries is not an efficient way 
to attract high-achieving students. If anything, high-achieving students have a lower valuation of 
salary than low-performing students. Finally, risk tolerant individuals seem to have a higher 
valuation of salary, which is hard to interpret. 
As discussed above and shown in Table 4, pay for performance does not seem to affect 
average job attractiveness. It is therefore interesting to examine whether individuals with high 
perceived ability or risk tolerance have a higher valuation of pay for performance than individuals 
with low perceived ability or risk tolerance. We do not find evidence for this: the valuation of pay 
for performance does not differ by grades, self-efficacy, or risk attitude. The estimation results 
suggest a gender difference: women appear to shy away from individual pay for performance, but 
not from team-based pay for performance.  
Finally, offering job security affects the composition of the pool of applicants. In line with 
economic theory, risk tolerant individuals care less about obtaining a permanent contract.  
 
 
                                                             
 
24 This is not because grades and self-efficacy are highly correlated: we obtain the same results when 
including these characteristics separately. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides evidence that high tech companies with a mission focusing on 
innovation or CSR have a competitive advantage on the labor market. Companies that provide 
employees with the opportunity to work on innovative projects or on making responsible and 
sustainable products can save on wages. Keeping all other job attributes constant, workers are on 
average willing to give up between €150 and €200 net per month. 
We also observe systematic heterogeneity in the valuation of attributes that may induce 
important selection effects in labor markets: companies that focus on innovation or CSR and 
sustainability are considered particularly more attractive by women and individuals who are 
relatively altruistic and less competitive. This insight is important for organizations for a number 
of reasons. First, since gender diversity is a common concern in the male-dominated field of 
engineering, it is important to know that a prosocial focus of the company can contribute to gender 
diversity in the workplace. Second, companies may benefit from attracting altruistic and less-
competitive workers, since workers with those attitudes arguably cooperate more effectively, and 
in particular when they feel motivated by the mission of the company.  
Besides mission of the company, we identify a number of other job attributes that 
individuals care about when choosing between jobs. Those attributes include traditional economic 
aspects such as salary, workload, and job security as well as important elements of job design 
such as autonomy and teamwork. We also find a number of other interesting sorting patterns. Job 
autonomy is particularly valued by women. Teamwork is highly valued by individuals who have 
high trust in others. A high salary is considered especially attractive by competitive and selfish 
individuals. Finally, the job security of a permanent contract attracts risk averse individuals.  
Organizations can use these insights strategically, and craft their organization and jobs in 
such a way that they attract the types that possess the traits and preferences that are most 
productive in a particular environment. Clearly, not all job attributes can easily be changed (e.g. 
occupation, absence of profit motive), but many aspects can be changed or emphasized more in 
job advertisements and recruitment procedures more broadly. For example, an organization with 
a strong focus on CSR and sustainability that is looking for a workforce with a competitive 
attitude can pay high salaries to attract those types. Also, organizations can often improve on the 
marketing of CSR initiatives to their employees (Bhattacharya et al., 2008).   
We consider our research as a first step to learn about the valuation and sorting effects of 
immaterial job attributes, and mission in particular. Future research could investigate in more 
detail why workers value a prosocial focus of the company. For instance, they may care about the 
contribution of their work to society, but they may also believe that organizations with a prosocial 
18 
 
 
mission have better chances to survive in the long run. Alternatively, they may perceive an 
organization’s prosocial mission as a signal that the organization also cares for its employees, or, 
in line with the findings of our study, that the work atmosphere it better because the workforce is 
more prosocial. Furthermore, our discrete choice experiment is specifically designed for 
engineers at the start of their career, and therefore particularly relevant for firms in the high-tech 
sector. Future research could explore the generality of the findings for other sectors, or among 
workers who have more experience or obtained less education. Another interesting question is to 
what extent organizations are aware of the sorting mechanisms described in this paper. Do they 
attract the people they would like to attract? It would also be interesting to learn how attracting 
different worker types translates into productivity changes. Those questions are left for further 
research.    
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Screenshot of discrete choice experiment 
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 Figure 2. Estimated monetary value of job attributes 
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Table 1. Overview of job attributes and their values in the discrete choice experiment 
 
 
Attributes Values 
Mission  
Focus of the company  For profit organization that is strongly profit orientated 
 For profit organization with a strong focus on innovation 
 For profit organization with a strong focus on corporate social 
responsibility and sustainability 
 Non-profit organization 
Job design  
Autonomy: control 
over own work 
 You have no influence on what you do and how you do it. 
 You have no influence on what you do, but you decide on how you do it. 
 You decide on what you do and how you do it. 
Teamwork  Work is conducted on one’s own,  
 Work is conducted in multidisciplinary teams,  
 Work is conducted in teams where people have the same expertise. 
Workload  High workload requires frequently working unpaid overtime. 
 Workload can usually be accomplished in regular working time.    
Contractible 
attributes 
 
Salary  €1800 netto per month 
 €2000 netto per month 
 €2200 netto per month 
Pay for performance  Fixed salary  
 10% higher or lower wage per month depending on individual 
performance  
 10% higher of lower wage per month depending on team performance.  
Job security  2 year temporary contract with 20% chance on permanent contract  
 2 year temporary contract with 80% chance on permanent contract   
 Permanent contract 
Occupation  Research and development,  
 Management, 
 Sales 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by university 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Eindhoven Delft Total P-value 
Age 25.42*** 24.99 25.16 0.01 
Second-year MSc (%) 63% 71%*** 68% 0.002 
Gender (% woman) 27% 36%*** 67% 0.000 
Nationality: Dutch 64% 61% 62% 0.22 
Grade (1-10) 7.47 7.57** 7.53 0.019 
Self-Efficacy 3.91 3.95 3.94 0.14 
Risk tolerance 6.36 6.30 6.32 0.56 
Competitiveness 3.16 3.11 3.13 0.34 
Trust 3.28 3.28 3.28 1.00 
Altruism -0.13 0.08*** -0.01 0.00 
N 595 903 1498 
 
     
Stars indicate significance of differences between Delft and Eindhoven: ** p<0.05, ***P<0.01. 
P-values are based on two-sided tests with unequal variances. 
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Table 3. Correlations between personal characteristics, personality traits and preferences 
 
  
A
g
e 
M
S
c 
y
ea
r 
U
n
iv
er
s.
 
N
at
io
n
al
. 
G
en
d
er
 
G
ra
d
e 
S
el
f 
E
ff
. 
R
is
k
 t
o
l.
 
C
o
m
p
. 
T
ru
st
 
A
lt
ru
is
m
 
Age 1.00 
          
MSc year (2nd) 0.17 1.00 
         
University (Delft) -0.07 0.08 1.00 
        
Nationality (Dutch) -0.12 0.15 -0.03 1.00 
       
Gender (woman) -0.07 -0.03 0.09 -0.01 1.00 
      
Grade -0.06 0.07 0.06 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
     
Self Efficacy 0.00 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.18 1.00 
    
Risk tolerance 0.12 -0.04 -0.02 -0.15 -0.02 0.06 0.26 1.00 
   
Competitiveness -0.08 0.03 -0.02 0.07 -0.13 0.10 0.28 0.22 1.00 
  
Trust -0.03 0.06 0.00 0.31 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04 1.00 
 
Altruism 0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.28 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.18 -0.13 0.04 1.00 
            
The interpretation of the highest value of binary variables is indicated between ().   
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Table 4. Estimation results of mixed rank-ordered logit model 
 
Method: Mixed rank-ordered logit   
 Mean coefficients 
SD random 
coefficients Monetary value 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Mission    
For-profit, profit oriented reference 
For-profit focus on innovation 0.408*** 0.576*** € 173.34 
 (0.051) (0.103)  
For-profit focus on CSR 0.518*** 0.943*** € 220.07 
 (0.055) (0.099)  
Non-profit 0.191*** 0.950*** € 81.15 
 (0.055) (0.092)  
Job design    
Control over work    
No autonomy reference 
Decide how to do, not what to do 0.487*** 0.744*** € 206.90 
 (0.046) (0.091)  
Decide how to do and what to do 0.941*** 1.095*** € 399.79 
 (0.056) (0.079)  
Teamwork    
Work conducted on one's own reference 
Multidisciplinary teams 0.671*** 1.22*** € 285.08 
 (0.072) (0.113)  
Monodisciplinary teams 0.366*** 0.960*** € 155.50 
 (0.068) (0.127)  
Workload    
High workload requires frequent working overtime reference 
No regular overtime required 0.772*** 0.847*** € 327.99 
 (0.045) (0.053)  
Contractible attributes    
Salary    
1800 net per month reference 
2000 net per month 0.497***  € 211.15 
 (0.044)   
2200 net per month 0.889***  € 377.70 
 (0.049)   
Pay for performance    
Fixed pay reference 
Individual pay for performance -0.055 0.895*** -€ 23.37 
 (0.065) (0.160)  
Team pay for performance -0.033 0.093 -€ 14.02 
 (0.039) (0.134)  
Job security    
20% chance on permanent contract reference 
80% chance on permanent contract 0.410*** 0.511*** € 174.19 
 (0.043) (0.096)  
permanent contract 0.597*** 0.813*** € 253.64 
  (0.048) (0.085)   
Observations 37450 
Individuals 1498 
Log-Likelihood -11781.18 
Stars indicate significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and 
reported in parentheses. Mixed rank-ordered logit model controlled for order effects and occupation. Rank is inverted 
so that higher values indicate a more attractive job. Column 1a reports the estimated mean coefficients and column 1b 
the standard deviation of the individual random coefficients. Column 1c reports estimates willingness to pay. 
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Table 5. Estimation results of mixed rank-ordered logit models interacted with individual characteristics 
 
Method: mixed rank-ordered logit Average 
effects 
 #Gender 
(female) 
#Grade #Self-
Efficacy 
#Risk 
Tolerance 
#Competi-
tiveness 
#Trust #Altruism 
 SD    
  (1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (1g) (1h) (1i) 
Mission          
For-profit, profit oriented reference 
For-profit focus on innovation 0.555*** 0.697*** 0.296*** 0.036 0.021 0.068 -0.125** -0.068 0.152*** 
 (0.089) (0.107) (0.115) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) 
For-profit focus on CSR 0.569*** 0.907*** 0.447*** 0.041 0.061 -0.016 -0.135** -0.022 0.195*** 
 (0.096) (0.127) (0.124) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) (0.055) (0.057) 
Non-profit 0.295*** 1.002*** 0.364*** 0.073 -0.016 -0.001 -0.259*** -0.048 0.140** 
 (0.097) (0.129) (0.120) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.062) (0.064) (0.061) 
Job design          
Control over work          
No autonomy reference 
Decide how to do, not what to do 0.650*** 0.640*** 0.178* 0.112*** 0.035 0.023 0.059 0.017 0.008 
 (0.076) (0.089) (0.105) (0.042) (0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.043) 
Decide how to do and what to do 1.133*** 0.986*** 0.386*** 0.071 0.078 0.030 0.107** 0.082 0.012 
 (0.090) (0.084) (0.118) (0.049) (0.056) (0.059) (0.051) (0.058) (0.053) 
Teamwork          
Work conducted on one's own reference 
Multidisciplinary teams 1.161*** 1.042*** -0.149 -0.013 0.061 0.099 0.047 0.152** -0.032 
 (0.119) (0.115) (0.140) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) (0.070) (0.071) (0.081) 
Monodisciplinary teams 0.789*** 0.828*** -0.251* 0.027 -0.060 0.048 -0.050 0.126* -0.059 
 (0.116) (0.101) (0.140) (0.066) (0.067) (0.070) (0.065) (0.071) (0.078) 
Workload          
Frequent overtime required reference 
No regular overtime required 0.958*** 0.778*** 0.132 -0.003 -0.065 -0.136*** -0.041 0.019 0.001 
 (0.072) (0.063) (0.083) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.040) 
Contractible attributes          
Salary          
1800 net per month reference 
2000 net per month 0.713***  -0.011 -0.047 0.017 0.011 0.078* -0.034 -0.068 
 (0.077)  (0.095) (0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) 
2200 net per month 1.253***  -0.001 -0.082* 0.071 0.108** 0.140*** -0.031 -0.163*** 
 (0.085)  (0.101) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.052) (0.051) 
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Table 5. Continued          
          
Pay for performance          
Fixed pay reference 
Individual pay for performance 0.089 0.616*** -0.361** 0.026 0.029 0.086 0.059 -0.004 0.041 
 (0.114) (0.207) (0.141) (0.069) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.069) (0.075) 
Team pay for performance -0.040 0.242 -0.116 -0.047 0.046 0.042 0.011 -0.040 0.021 
 (0.070) (0.153) (0.088) (0.037) (0.044) (0.044) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) 
Job security          
20% chance on permanent contract reference 
80% chance on permanent contract 0.555*** 0.383*** 0.053 -0.045 -0.077* -0.078 0.043 0.036 0.020 
 (0.075) (0.136) (0.097) (0.056) (0.043) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) 
permanent contract 0.693*** 0.766*** 0.085 0.010 0.017 -0.178*** 0.062 -0.005 0.002 
  (0.080) (0.087) (0.103) (0.046) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) 
Observations 35725 
Individuals 1429 
Stars indicate significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses. Mixed rank-ordered logit 
regression of job rank on job attributes, interacted with university, nationality, and all individual characteristics. Occupation and order effects are included, but not reported. 
Individual characteristics are standardized. Rank is inverted so that higher values indicate a more attractive job. Columns (1a) and (1b) report main effects and standard 
deviation of individual coefficients, respectively. 
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Appendix: Follow-up questionnaire 
 
To test whether the preferences of the respondents in our stated-choice experiment are 
reflected in their job satisfaction when they are employed, we have sent a short follow-up 
questionnaire to the graduates of the Eindhoven University of Technology who gave us 
permission to do so. We conducted this survey in October 2018, i.e., more than three years after 
the initial survey. Of the 374 individuals contacted, 118 completed the survey (32% response 
rate). Of these graduates, 7 were not employed and 3 did not complete all survey questions, 
leaving us with 108 complete responses. Apart from gender and nationality, we do not observe 
statistically significant differences in personal characteristics between individuals who 
participated in the initial sample, but did not participate in the follow-up survey.  The respondents 
to the follow-up survey seem more representative for the whole student population of Eindhoven 
University of Technology than our initial survey sample. In our follow-up survey, 19% of 
respondents is female, compared to 20% in the student population and 27% of initial survey 
participants. Our follow-up survey consists of 71% Dutch nationals, which is more than in the 
initial survey (64%) but still an underrepresentation compared to the student population (82% 
Dutch).  
We asked respondents to describe their current job with regard to the same job attributes 
we included in the hypothetical choice experiment. Table A1 provides an overview of the 
questions we asked to describe the current job, as well as the response frequencies. Most questions 
force respondents to make a choice between two or three answer categories. An exception is 
mission of the company. Respondents rate the importance of profit, innovation, and CSR on a 11-
point Likert scale, respectively. To give an impression of the distribution, we reclassify their 
answers into three different categories: Not important (0-5), Important (6-8), Very Important (9-
10). A focus on innovation is rated highest. With regard to the other questions, we observe quite 
some variation in the answers. This confirms that the range of values in the discrete choice 
experiment is generally relevant for graduates’ job choice.  
We regress these characteristics on job satisfaction as measured on a 11-point Likert-
scale (average score 7.58, standard deviation 1.55). We transform the ratings of the importance 
of profit, innovation and CSR mission of the company as follows. We calculate the importance 
ratings of innovation and CSR relative to the importance rating of profit, then take the log of this 
ratio and standardize. The estimation results are reported in Table A2. In the first column, we 
control for gender and nationality. In the second column, we add potentially endogenous controls 
such as tenure, whether the workplace is located in the Netherlands, and occupation. Interestingly, 
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we find that respondents who report working in an organization with a strong emphasis on 
innovation relative to profit are more satisfied with their job. This finding is in line with the 
findings from our discrete choice experiment. However, we do not find that those who work in 
organizations emphasizing CSR are more satisfied with their job.  
Consistent with our hypothetical choice experiment, graduates who report having more 
autonomy also report significantly higher job satisfaction. As expected, teamwork is also 
associated with higher job satisfaction, although this effect is only statistically significant when 
teams are monodisciplinary. Workload is negatively associated with job satisfaction, but this 
effect is not statistically significant. Finally, a permanent contract is reflected in higher job 
satisfaction, while performance pay has no statistically significant effect.  
It would be interesting to analyze whether there is a relation between individuals’ 
preferences expressed in the experiment and attributes of their current job. Unfortunately, the 
sample size (N=108) is too limited for such an analysis. Moreover, since job characteristics are 
self-reported, individuals with stronger preferences are likely to be more critical in their 
evaluation, biasing results towards zero. Given the small number of observations and lack of 
exogenous variation, we should be careful not to overinterpret the findings above. Nevertheless, 
they provide some evidence that workers care about the job attributes that show up as important 
in the hypothetical discrete choice experiment. 
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Table A1. Follow-up survey: descriptive statistics on respondents’ current job 
 
 
How would you describe your organization: profit or non-profit? N Percent 
Non-Profit 35 32% 
Profit 73 68% 
   
How important is profit in the culture of your company?   
Not important 43 40% 
Important 37 34% 
Very important 28 26% 
   
How important is innovation in the culture of your company?   
Not important 15 14% 
Important 46 43% 
Very important 47 44% 
   
How important is CSR in the culture of your company?   
Not important 28 26% 
Important 58 54% 
Very important 22 20% 
   
How much autonomy do you have in your job?   
No influence at all 2 2% 
No influence on what you do, only on how to do it  40 37% 
Influence on what you do and how you do it 66 61% 
   
How is work typically conducted?   
Conducted on your own 35 32% 
Teams where people have the same expertise 23 21% 
Work is conducted in multidisciplinary teams 50 46% 
   
How would you describe your workload?   
Moderate workload 74 69% 
High workload, requires frequent overtime 34 31% 
   
Does your salary include performance-related components?   
No 77 71% 
Yes 31 29% 
   
What describes your employment prospects best?   
No prospect on permanent contract 22 20% 
Good prospect on permanent contract 21 19% 
Permanent contract 65 60% 
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Table A2. Follow-up survey: current job characteristics and job satisfaction  
Method: OLS Job satisfaction Job satisfaction 
 (1) (2) 
Mission     
Mission: importance innovation relative to profit 1.002*** 0.861** 
 (0.323) (0.343) 
Mission: importance CSR relative to profit -0.125 -0.123 
 (0.287) (0.296) 
Autonomy   
No or little autonomy reference 
Full autonomy 0.599** 0.577* 
 (0.301) (0.307) 
Teamwork   
Mostly individual reference 
Teamwork: monodisciplinary 0.973*** 0.964*** 
 (0.364) (0.352) 
Teamwork: multidisciplinary 0.492 0.496 
 (0.299) (0.305) 
Workload   
Moderate workload reference 
High workload, frequent overtime -0.470 -0.453 
 (0.316) (0.335) 
Performance-related pay   
no reference 
yes 0.361 0.231 
 (0.253) (0.263) 
Job security   
No prospect on permanent contract reference 
good prospect on permanent contract 1.010** 1.061** 
 (0.480) (0.433) 
Permanent contract 1.494*** 1.609*** 
 (0.478) (0.459) 
Gender   
Male reference 
Female -0.090 -0.169 
 (0.420) (0.468) 
Nationality   
Non-Dutch reference 
Dutch 0.275 0.296 
 (0.297) (0.368) 
Controls: tenure, workplace in Netherlands, occupation No Yes 
Observations 108 108 
R-squared 0.37 0.41 
Stars indicate significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
importance of innovation relative to profit is defined as the log of the ratio of the importance of innovation 
over the importance of profit, both rated on a 11-point Likert scale. The importance of CSR relative to profit 
is defined similarly. These two variables are standardized for ease of interpretation. 
 
